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INTRODUCTION  
This paper presents the historical and contextual background of road construction by state 
and local government in Queensland. It also highlights some key events that have shaped 
stakeholder participation in road infrastructure planning and delivery in Queensland. This 
synthesis was developed from a review of publications, organisational documents and 
interviews. To set the scene, the factors that shaped road delivery will be discussed.   
 
FACTORS THAT SHAPED ROAD DELIVERY  
As the most decentralised state in Australia, Queensland has a very dispersed road network. 
The public road network in Queensland currently covers 180,000 kilometres, comprising 
33,337 kilometres of state-controlled roads (Department of Transport and Main Roads, 2010) 
and 150,000 kilometres of road which is under the stewardship of 73 local government 
councils (Local Government Assocation of Queensland Inc, 2002).  Public investment in 
these road assets by state and local government is in the order of $30 billion (Department of 
Transport and Main Roads, 2010). 
 
Private vehicle ownership is the predominant mode of transport in Queensland (Department 
of Transport and Main Roads, 2009), thus the road network in Queensland is one of the 
primary connectors for regional and urban communities and is important for their 
sustainability. Surpassing rail, road transport is the leading mode of transport for 
commodities (Productivity Commission, 2006) making  road infrastructure is critical to state 
and regional economic development in Queensland. However, the current social and 
economic importance of roads in Queensland and decisions about who should have input into 
5 
 
their planning and delivery has been influenced by policy decisions and subsequent events 
over the past 150 years.   
 
Early Days of Road Construction  
Although roads were constructed throughout Queensland from the early days of colonisation, 
the concept of establishing a state-wide managed road network began to emerge in the late 
nineteenth century. This was legitimised by the creation of a central roads authority, the Main 
Roads Board in 1920.  The total length of roads controlled by the Board at that time was 
1,209 miles (Simmonds, 2007), which is around 17% of the size of the current state road 
network. Prior to 1920, road construction had been the domain of local shire councils that 
focused on meeting the requirements of local communities. This meant that road construction 
between towns was largely ad hoc, unplanned and lacking in a state-wide focus. To overcome 
this problem, the Board established a road classification system under which local councils 
retained responsibility for roads within towns, while roads outside of towns became the 
responsibility of the Board.   
 
Three priorities underpinned activities of the Board: 1. to build roads which joined towns not 
connected by railway, 2. to construct a series of feeder roads linking farming areas to the 
existing rail network, and 3. to build developmental roads designed to open new areas for 
settlement (Department of Main Roads, n/d-b, p. 15). While the  Board assumed 
responsibility for construction of these roads, shire councils contributed up to half of the 
construction costs and were responsible for subsequent maintenance (Department of Main 
Roads, n/d-b).  This approach to sharing road construction costs between regional councils 
and the now amalgamated Department of Transport and Main Roads (TMR) has continued 
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through the Transport Infrastructure Development Scheme (TIDS program) (Department of 
Transport and Main Roads, 2010). 
 
As awareness grew of the strategic importance of roads in Australia’s economic development 
and a means of nation building by linking rural communities, the federal government began 
to inject funding into the Queensland road network and by 1922, was providing road 
subsidies totalling 35,000 pounds.  This type of funding continues today through the Roads to 
Recovery Program which has directed $356 million in road funding to local authorities in 
Queensland from 2009-2014 (Department of Infrastructure and Transport, 2010). 
 
By the time that the  Main Roads Board was established as a Commission in 1922, the 
political dimensions of road decision making were becoming evident, with questions being 
asked about political favouritism and “why certain road projects were chosen at the expense 
of others” (Department of Main Roads, n/d-b, p. 26).  This politicisation was also 
demonstrated in the long-standing rivalry between road and rail transport which was partially 
driven by the differing priorities of the state and federal state governments.  At the state level, 
maintaining employment on the railways and the repayment of the massive debt incurred in 
construction of the railway was a high priority.  However, without the debt burden, the 
federal government’s priority was national highway construction. The situation was 
exacerbated by the Royal Automobile Club of Queensland (RACQ) lobbying in favour of 
motor vehicle transport (Department of Main Roads, n/d-a) 
 
However, the dominance of rail over road began to diminish with the introduction of the by 
Road Plan for Queensland in 1963 (Ford, 2009) the Department of Main Roads  (Main 
Roads) .  In responding to shifts in population, the Plan, which remained in force until 2001, 
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provided for roads to be constructed to service populations over 500. The decision to 
dramatically increase the size of the road network in Queensland,  which is the most 
dispersed in Australia (Doyle, 2008), also contributed to the rise of road freight transport.  In 
such a highly decentralised state the expanded road network provided greater road access to 
farming and extractive industry areas in rural and remote Queensland, which improved the 
viability of road freight.  Over time, the accessibility of roads has resulted in a high level of 
dependence on road transport to undertake the freight task across Queensland (Local 
Government Association of Queensland Inc, n/d). 
 
From the early 1920’s, the state road construction authority has had to balance the competing 
demands of a range of groups including: federal, state and local elected representatives, 
politicians, the RACQ, local authorities, industry and farming communities (Department of 
Main Roads, n/d-b).  However, the political sensitivity of road placement meant that road 
planning during the twentieth century was tightly controlled by state government and 
centralised within Main Roads.  Implicit in this approach was that road planning and delivery 
involved technical problems to be solved rather than negotiation processes involving a wide 
range of actors with conflicting needs and interests.  As a result of this  technocratic 
approach, “little consultation or consideration of stakeholders other than motor vehicle users 
occurred” (Waterhouse & Keast, 2007).  
 
 
However, the technocratic approach began to be eroded  the late 1980’s as a range of 
different actors, including project specific lobby groups, began to push back against 
traditional insular road planning decisions.  This shift is demonstrated in the forceful response 
of stakeholders in two high profile road projects in South-East Queensland.  These will be 
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examined in the next section to illustrate the complex nature of growing/emerging 
stakeholder engagement in road infrastructure.    
 
TURBULENT TIMES FOR ROAD PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION   
Between 1987 and 1996, there was a significant investment in road infrastructure in 
Queensland, particularly in the southeast corner of the state.  Route 20 and the South Coast 
Motorway between Brisbane and the Gold Coast were two high profile road construction 
projects of that period that attracted significant negative attention from an extended range 
stakeholders.  These projects set the scene for greater involvement of stakeholders in road 
decision-making at the end of the twentieth century.  At first the Queensland government was 
dismissive of attempts by citizens and interest groups to secure input into these road projects; 
however, in the face of unrelenting pressure they were accepted as groups that needed to be 
engaged.  
 
In 1987, Main Roads commenced planning to construct the Western Arterial Bypass ring 
road in Brisbane, known as Route 20. This proposal met with significant opposition from a 
coalition of stakeholders called Citizens Against Route Twenty (CART) (Whelan, 2001; 
Witherby, 1996). This opposition  strengthened after it was identified in a leaked confidential 
government document that the government was seeking to “defuse the route 20 issue and try 
to eliminate public comment” (Citizens Against Route Twenty, 1989, p. 6 ).  After an intense 
media campaign spearheaded by CART, work was suspended on Route 20 until completion 
of an environmental and social impact statement.  By effectively mobilising the media to 
oppose the road, which was seen to be shrouded in secrecy and subterfuge (Citizens Against 
Route Twenty, 1989, p. 5), “Route 20 was scuttled in 1990 after resident protests” (Heywood, 
2000, p. 19).   
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Criticising the defunct Route 20 planning process, a member of the state opposition observed 
that the policy “had more in common with a Monty Python script than sensible town-
planning”(Queensland Parliament, Record of Proceedings, March 20, 1990, p.410).  
While falling short of acknowledging problems with Route 20, the government later 
conceded that “People deserve the chance to have a say in significant decisions that affect 
their lives and lifestyles” and “gave an undertaking to establish proper consultative programs 
to address road safety issues on Route 20” (Queensland Parliament, Record of Proceedings, 
August 2, 1990, p. 2664). 
 
The problematic nature of the Route 20 project points to the fact that neither the government 
nor Main Roads had understood the need or benefits of engaging with stakeholders in road 
projects.  The inadequacy of using a state controlled expert-led approach which shut out 
external inputs into the planning for Route 20, resulted in significant concessions by 
government. These included a comprehensive consultation process (Dick, 1990), “a rare 
event in Queensland at the time“ (Hutton & Connors, 1999, p.220).  While a change of 
approach had been forced by the Route 20 stakeholders, government had yet to embrace the 
fundamental issue that effective engagement of stakeholders was required to achieve 
successful road program planning and delivery.  
 
In 1995, the interest of stakeholders in road planning decisions intensified as a result the 
proposal of the government to build the South Coast Motorway parallel to the Pacific 
Highway.  As the motorway was to pass through the koala habitat of the Daisy Hill State 
Forest, it was dubbed the “Koala Highway”. The proposal evoked significant community 
opposition (Krosch, 2010) with residents fearing the destruction of koala habitats during and 
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after the development of the highway (Marinac, 2002). It appeared that the government 
misjudged the strength of public feeling about the roadway and faced intense opposition with 
the environment minister being targeted with protests, placards and dead koalas. (Wason 
Moore, 2005). 
 
 The “Koala Highway” protests were widely covered by the media  and “it became obvious 
that no amount of reassurance was going to swing public opinion in favour of the plan” 
(Marinac, 2002, p. 82). As a result of the widespread and unrelenting opposition, the road 
proposal was abandoned.  However the “Koala Highway” was a decisive issue in the 1995 
election (Riley, 1993) with the incumbent government losing four seats, and eventually  
losing government in a by-election in 1996 (Waterhouse, Brown, & Flynn, 2001).   
 
While Route 20 and the South Coast motorway situations represent extreme actions by 
stakeholders who considered that their concerns were not being treated seriously (Citizens 
Against Route Twenty, 1989; Marinac, 2002), they serve to demonstrate the difficulties of 
managing the diverse expectations and interests of stakeholders within the complex and 
politically volatile environment of road infrastructure planning and delivery.  The impact that 
stakeholders had on both the Route 20 and the South Coast motorway projects exemplifies 
the problems associated with conventional approaches to stakeholder engagement. However, 
these approaches gave way to more relational and deliberative methods of stakeholder 
engagement and this is discussed next.  
 
NEW APPROACHES 
The Route 20 and the South Coast Motorway experiences galvanised Main Roads into 
reviewing how and when it should engage stakeholders and the wider community and how it 
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could improve on its public consultation policy. This policy review may also have been 
prompted by the realisation that “the future survival of  as a separate government department 
was closely tied to its ability to foster good external relationships both with the community 
and through partnerships and alliances, community groups, private enterprise and local 
government ” (Waterhouse, 2003, p. 111).  
 
 Acknowledging that “as ' work becomes more complex, community involvement more 
strident,……..  must shift from a "one size fits all" approach ”(McLennan, 2000, p. 7), Main 
Roads made fundamental changes to how it related to stakeholders.  This shift was 
underpinned by two mechanisms: the introduction of partnership and alliance agreements and 
strengthening of the public consultation policy to require mandatory community engagement 
in departmental projects.  
 
The shift to more networked approaches to road delivery by Main Roads could be seen 
through the establishment of alliances which were formed with an industry group, the 
Australian Asphalt Pavement Association, and with local government through the Roads 
Alliance.  The 2001 agreement with the Asphalt Association committed  the parties to 
collaboratively “increase innovation and optimise the performance of road pavements 
(AAPA/Main Roads Strategic Alliance Strategic Alliance, 2001, p. 1)  and in doing so, made 
the Alliance Board accountable for management of external stakeholders.  Such alliances 
paved the way for the introduction of more formal partnering arrangements in the area of 
project delivery.   
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Alliance contracts which combined contractual arrangements with an agreement to a joint 
project vision and a focus on managing relationships as a means of improving project 
outcomes began to emerge as an alternate project delivery methodology. Alliance contracting 
was thought to be particularly suitable for projects where there were “various diverse key 
stakeholder interests to be brought together early and these key stakeholder interfaces and 
relationships” were complex (Queensland Government, 2008, p.16). Through the use of 
alliance contacting, Main Roads was able to ensure early engagement of both project partners 
and external stakeholders to negotiate the best possible solutions for all parties.  In this way 
local knowledge and community expertise could be blended with technical knowledge to 
create better outcomes.  
 
The Port of Brisbane Motorway (PoBM) project in the early 2000’s provides an example of 
the benefits of relational contracts through improved relationships with stakeholders.  The 
project was highly complex; involving the construction of five kilometres of motorway, 
twelve bridges and a multi-level interchange over the Gateway Motorway (Manley & Blayse, 
2003).  As a result of this complexity, an alliance contract was chosen as the project 
procurement method.  The underpinning premise of this decision was that optimal project 
outcomes and minimisation of the conflicts and disputes could be achieved by embedding 
collaboration and sound relationships into the project governance system.  Alliance 
contracting was also partially selected in recognition of the need to deal with “poor 
stakeholder/community relations” (Manley & Blayse, 2003, p. 19).    
 
The project involved two types of stakeholders: project partners who were the decision 
makers and community stakeholders who were consulted during the project. The project 
partners included the “the state and federal government, two government owned corporations 
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and a consortium of three private sector organisations” (Waterhouse, 2003, p. 139). External 
stakeholders included a local school, residents, road users and environmental groups. 
Difficulties were experienced with external stakeholders about a number of issues: the 
“stop/start” character of the project, noise concerns, loss of access and environmental 
problems (Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation, 2004).  The Alliance 
proactively addressed these issues by implementing a series of targeted processes designed to 
increase community interest and connectivity with the project.  
 
A particularly difficult stakeholder issue facing the project was the rehabilitation of the 
Bulimba Creek Oxbow.  While commitments had been given to undertake the rehabilitation, 
the scope of the work was increased to satisfy stakeholder demands.  An additional $250,000 
in funding was injected into the rehabilitation project and flood modelling technology was 
used to demonstrate to stakeholders that appropriate environmental outcomes could be 
achieved (Cooperative Research Centre for Construction Innovation, 2004). By bringing 
stakeholders into the project from an early stage, providing ongoing opportunities for issues 
to be raised and working collaboratively to find solutions, stakeholder engagement appears to 
have contributed to the project being completed six months early with a cost saving of $13.4 
million (Manley & Blayse, 2003).  
 
In addition to using alliances and alliance contracts which focused  on the importance of 
relationships in construction planning and projects, in the early 2000’s Main Roads  shifted 
its policy position from public consultation and introduced a requirement for community 
engagement in all departmental projects (Doyle & Addison, 2005).  Adoption of the 
Community Engagement Improvement Strategy by the Queensland Government in 2002 
(Queensland Government, 2003) legitimised the position taken by Main Roads to focus 
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strongly on community engagement.  This decision had a significant impact on the breadth of 
stakeholders involved in road planning and construction in Queensland due to the number, 
value and geographic reach of contracts awarded by the department.  In 2010/11 (Transport 
and Main Roads, n/d) TMR expects to award contracts to the value of $650 million for fifty 
two projects situated across eighteen local government areas in Queensland.  Despite the 
changed focus of stakeholder engagement in planning and construction of state-controlled 
roads, until recently, local government did not have the same impetus to engage with 
community engagement 
 
CHANGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
Prior to changes to legislative changes in 2010, the, engagement of local communities in 
council planning decisions, including road decision making, was discretionary. In 2004 
(Local Government Association of Queensland Inc., , p. 3) growing concern was expressed 
“that Local Government’s engagement practice and techniques, including community 
consultation, demand improvement”. However, changes to the  Local Government Act 2009 
have required that “meaningful community engagement” must inform council decision 
making processes (Department of Infrastructure and Planning, 2010, p. 2). Although the 
impact of this change is not yet apparent, it could be argued that there will be a flow-on 
effect, resulting in higher levels of stakeholder engagement in road planning and delivery by 
regional councils.   
 
Policy and legislative changes which have impacted on stakeholder engagement in road 
decision making in Queensland have been accompanied by changes in the way road planning 
and construction occurs. Of significance has been the introduction of networked 
arrangements for road delivery, and in particular the Roads Alliance  
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NETWORKED ARRANGEMENTS FOR ROAD PLANNING AND DELIVERY   
As a result of the long-standing relationships between local government and state road 
authority a high degree of interdependence exists between the two levels of government. For 
example, in some parts of the state, TMR relies on local government to deliver its 
maintenance program.  Despite council amalgamations in 2008, some small regional council, 
remain reliant upon TMR for funding which creates stability for the local workforce.   
In 2002,  Main Roads leveraged this long-standing relationship with its primary stakeholders, 
local government (Department of Main Roads, 2008), in establishing the Roads Alliance, a 
partnership between the Local Government Association of Queensland (LGAQ), local 
governments and the department.  The Roads Alliance is  now responsible for managing a 
five year program of regional investment for 32,000 kilometres of regionally significant local 
raods across Queensland (Department of Main Roads & Local Government Association of 
Queensland, 2008).  The primary source of funding is the Transport Infrastructure 
Development Scheme (TIDS) which is in the order of $3 billion over five years. TIDS 
provides funding to local governments for transport-related infrastructure development and is 
allocated among RRGs to primarily undertake minor works and maintenance projects.  
Establishment of the Roads Alliance was approached by Main Roads as a stakeholder 
engagement activity targeting two key stakeholder groups: LGAQ and 125 local councils. 
Bringing these stakeholders together in partnership with Main Roads involved extensive state 
wide consultation to obtain commitment to the alliance approach. Acknowledging “that the 
community wants a seamless high standard road system irrespective of the ownership of 
individual links” (The Roads Alliance, 2010, p. 14) the Roads Alliance brought together 
councils and  in a co-operative arrangement to deliver and  integrated road  program across 
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Queensland.  This joint commitment by state and local government was also driven by the 
“need to act collectively to achieve systemic, state-wide improvement in planning, resource-
use and capability... to deliver the outcomes required by their stakeholders” (Doyle & 
Addison, 2006, p. 19).   
Governance 
Doyle  (2008, p. 185) contends that  the Roads Alliance represents “a new way of thinking 
about governance”, challenging the traditional siloed ways that  Main Roads and local 
government managed the road system.  This new approach incorporated a number of key 
features: it brought together political and technical actors in collaborative decision-making 
processes, provided a mechanism for long-term road planning that transcended local and state 
election cycles, and transferred control of state government funding priorities to a series of 
regionally-based governance bodies: Regional Roads Groups (RRGs).  
 
As depicted in Diagram 1, the Roads Alliance operates through a multi-level structure 
comprising a Board, network management group (RAPT) and eighteen RRGs and their 
associated Technical Committees.  
Diagram 1 Structure of the Roads Alliance  
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(Department of Main Roads & Local Government Association of Queensland, 2008). 
As indicated in Diagram 1, the Roads Alliance operates as a three tier committee structure 
with each level having distinctive responsibilities. At the meso level, the Board is responsible 
for setting the strategic direction of the Roads Alliance and overseeing implementation and 
operations across the state.  At the operational level, RRGs are responsible for the 
management of the local roads  network, including investment and maintenance decisions as 
well as collaborating to address regional transport issues (Local Government Association of 
Queensland & Department of Main Roads, 2008 ). Acting as a conduit between the Board 
and RRGs, RAPT undertakes a number of network management functions with a particular 
focus on co-ordination and driving the implementation of programs and initiatives set by the 
Board.  The linkages between the three subgroups comprising the Roads Alliance are 
depicted in Diagram 2. 
 
Diagram 2 Linkages between the sub-groups of the Road Alliance 
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The Board  “is the highest level decision making body of the Alliance” (The Roads Alliance, 
2008, p.5)  with membership limited to senior representatives of the alliance partners: TMR 
and LGAQ. One the Board’s major roles is to ensure effective governance arrangements for 
the Alliance. Governance at the Board level operates through a traditional bureaucratic 
committee model in which directions come from the top down with RAPT co-ordinating 
among the RRG’s on behalf of the Board.  As a result of this intermediary relationship, there 
is little connection between the Board and RRGs. This may also be a result of the wide 
geographical dispersion of RRGs across the state.  
 
Operating within a multi-dimensional governance framework, has resulted in a closer 
alignment between the Alliance and its two major stakeholders: Main Roads and LGAQ                  
(Doyle, 2008).  Despite the desired objective of achieving “collaborative road network 
management” (The Roads Alliance, 2008 ), the Roads Alliance represents a largely exclusive 
space in which alliance partners and the seventy six councils interact.  The relatively 
impervious boundaries mean that there is limited opportunity for input into by other 
stakeholders affected by delivery of roads in regional council areas.  
 
The RRGs function as regional decision-making bodies which make use of both bureaucratic 
and networked structural arrangements to deliver small, but politically significant, regional 
works programs. While participation by local governments is voluntary, there are financial 
incentives for participating i.e. additional road funding for individual councils.  RRGs 
comprise two interlinked groups, one of which focuses on engineering issues and the other 
operates at the political level. This approach distinguishes between the technical and political 
aspects of regional road delivery. 
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 “Underpinned by differing operating frameworks...and each requires different actors, 
institutional arrangements and strategies”  (Keast, Mandell, & Brown, 2006, p. 27),  RRGs 
operate in a complex environment which combines both hierarchical and network governance 
modes.  The formal governance structure of RRGs is enshrined in their constitutions (Local 
Government Association of Queensland & Department of Main Roads, 2008 ) and also 
follows a traditional hierarchical approach in which decision making occurs vertically 
between the politically focused RRG and engineering based technical committee with 
reporting back through RAPT to the Board.    
 
Alongside the hierarchical arrangements, RRGs also exhibit some network governance 
features.  As  TMR has ceded authority for the TIDS program to RRGs, these groups have 
decision-making authority for prioritisation and expenditure of funds  Further RRGs are 
expected to operate in a manner which promotes ”cross regional collaboration” (The Roads 
Alliance, 2008) and resource sharing. Additionally, some RRGs have a designated network 
manager i.e. technical co-ordinators whose role is primarily co-ordination and driving joint 
initiatives to keep RRGs “ moving forward and achieving desired milestones” (Local 
Government Association of Queensland Inc., 2009, p. 9).  
 
RRGs operate in a mixed governance mode incorporating bureaucratic administrative 
systems and network features and cuts across state and local government jurisdictional 
boundaries. The extent to which external stakeholders are involved in RRG activities i.e. who 
is included and who is excluded, appears to be tightly controlled. The majority of stakeholder 
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engagement occurring within RRG boundaries, demonstrating a reliance on more traditional 
approaches in which preference is given to internal inputs.  By maintaining rigid boundaries, 
there is little external input from the broader range of stakeholders. For example, broader 
community input into RRG business is obtained indirectly “through routine community 
engagement activities undertaken by  and local councils” and is “considered in the Alliance 
process” (Wright, 2006, p. 7).   
 
This closed approach may be applicable where RRGs are conducting “business as usual”. 
However more intensive interaction with a wider group of stakeholders may become 
necessary as funding priorities for road delivery change and access to resources becomes 
more difficult. For RRGs to effectively transition to a more relational model of stakeholder 
involvement more needs to be understood about the governance systems that RRGs employ, 
and the issues that arise for stakeholder engagement from the choice of governance approach. 
  
CONCLUSION  
This paper has provided historical and contextual background pertaining to road planning and 
delivery in Queensland, and has shown that the influence of stakeholders on road planning 
and delivery is not a new issue.  From the early twentieth century, road construction 
authorities in Queensland have been buffeted by competing pressures exerted by traditional 
stakeholders including the three tiers of government, elected representatives, motoring 
organisations, industry and communities. As well, new stakeholders including environmental 
groups, industry organisations and community based organisations have emerged as the 
social, economic and environmental impacts of road management have become more 
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apparent. However it is not always clear how the needs these stakeholders are incorporated in 
road decision making and what approaches are the most effective.  
 
Traditional expert-led responses to stakeholder pressures are no longer effective. This 
position  is supported by Stirling (2001, p. 71) who asserts that “Divergent public interests 
and values cannot therefore be adequately addressed by ‘bolting on’ inclusive deliberation at 
the end of an expert-led process”. As demonstrated in the Route 20 and Pacific Motorway 
cases, inadequate stakeholder engagement at the outset of planning was a major contributor to 
significant and costly project disruptions. In the case of the Pacific Motorway, this resulted in 
severe political consequences.   
 
Expert-led processes of consultation have gradually given way to much deeper stakeholder 
engagement activities which focus on achieving mutually beneficial outcomes. The 
introduction of new models of governance has driven the development of networked 
arrangements for road delivery which incorporate more relational approaches to managing 
interactions with stakeholders.  The effectiveness of such approaches was exemplified in the 
PoBM project, in which effective stakeholder engagement contributed to delivery of the 
motorway under budget and ahead of schedule,  
 
At a regional level, Main Roads and local governments have come together to jointly manage 
a regional system of roads through networked arrangements which incorporate a mix of 
hierarchical and relational elements. However what drives stakeholder prioritisation and 
engagement, and how these processes are linked remains unclear.  Future empirical research 
exploring examples of networked arrangements for road delivery needs to be undertaken to 
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gain an understanding of how stakeholder prioritisation occurs and how such decisions flow 
though to stakeholder engagement activities.  
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